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FOREWORD
LEGAL PROCESS
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE REGULATION
OF LAWYERS
Ted Schneyer*
INTRODUCFION
Q CHOLARS are renewing their interest in the proper allocation of
regulatory authority, an issue of central concern in the "legal pro-
cess" literature1 that first became prominent in the 1950s.2 Legal pro-
cess scholarship examines the competence of various institutions to
perform regulatory tasks. Recent legal process work often relies on
social science concepts to explain or predict institutional behavior. It
also posits that an institution's strengths and weaknesses should not
be judged in isolation. Because no institution performs any important
regulatory task perfectly, and because many tasks could conceivably
be reassigned, the proper research question is often one of compara-
tive competence.3 A legal process scholar might argue that a certain
institution, because of its relative ability to gather pertinent informa-
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law and 1995 Chair of the
Section on Professional Responsibility of the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS").
1. See, eg., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 Cal.
L. Rev. 919 (1989) (reviewing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988)); Edward
L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1996) (discussing the legal process model as a
way of synthesizing legal scholarship); Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the
New Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 463 [hereinafter Rubin, Institutional Analysis]
(reviewing Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law,
Economics, and Public Policy (1994)).
2. The locus classicus for the principles espoused by the legal process school is
the famous teaching materials developed in the late 1950's at Harvard Law School by
Professors Hart and Sacks. Those materials were finally published, to considerable
fanfare, in 1994. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (,Villiam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
3. The use of concepts from economics and public choice theory and the insis-
tence on institutional comparisons are prominent in Neil Komesar's work. See Neil K
Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Pub-
lic Policy 3-10 (1994). Professor Komesar criticizes legal scholars who draw conclu-
sions about the decision-making competence of a given institution without
considering the strengths and weaknesses of alternative institutions. For example, he
criticizes John Hart Ely's argument that the courts must closely scrutinize the Consti-
tutionality of statutes that significantly affect legislatively underrepresented minori-
ties; Ely takes no account of the possibility that minorities might fare worse at the
hands of unelected judges than they fare in legislatures. Id. at 198-230.
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tion, should perform a regulatory task.4 Or, she might explain
through institutional comparison why certain institutions have come
to perform a given task.5
Legal process studies have their most immediate value to policy
makers when the studies focus on specific tasks and institutions.
Comparing the general pros and cons of legislatures, administrative
agencies, and self-regulating organizations as regulators of occupa-
tions is an interesting exercise, but one less likely to influence policy
than asking what role Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC"), and the New York Stock Exchange should play in mak-
ing rules to govern the trading practices of securities broker-dealers.
Regulatory institutions now vary so much in structure and operation
that if policy makers are to assign tasks wisely, they often need more
finely grained comparisons than broad categories allow.6 Nowhere is
this need clearer than with respect to the issue that inspires this Sym-
posium: Who should regulate lawyers?
In 1992, Professor David Wilkins posed that question in a pioneer-
ing article that views lawyer regulation through a legal process lens.
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?7 develops an intriguing framework for
explaining and evaluating the allocation of regulatory authority. The
4. In my own work on the regulation of lawyers, for example, I have argued that
law firms are sometimes better than disciplinary agencies at getting to the bottom of a
possible ethics violation within their walls. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Disciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 Comell L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professional
Discipline]. For this and other reasons, I propose that law firms, and not just individ-
ual lawyers, be subject to professional discipline. Id. at 8-11. If no individual has been
disciplined in a bar proceeding, but "a disciplined firm... [considers] it important to
assign individual blame for the underlying infraction, [the firm can] do so on the basis
of its own internal investigation." Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
"No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 408 (1981) (arguing that corporations
are in a better position than the state to detect and punish crimes by their employees,
partly because their use of internal sanctions is not subject to due process control).
5. I have argued, for example, that, partly because of their institutional limita-
tions, the state disciplinary agencies responsible for enforcing ethics rules were unable
to play any role in the recent and massive legal response to the alleged wrongdoing of
the large-firm lawyers who represented banks and thrift institutions shortly before the
savings-and-loan crisis. See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism:
What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 639, 643-
50 (1994) (discussing in particular the lack of disciplinary authority to proceed against
law firms as entities, to provide structural relief or substantial money sanctions, or to
debar lawyers from specialized fields of practice). For another scholar's institutional
explanation for the virtual nonuse of legal ethics rules and professional discipline to
regulate lawyers representing clients in business negotiations, see Charles W. Wolf-
ram, Modem Legal Ethics 714 (student ed. 1986) (pointing out that such negotiations
can be conducted by the parties themselves or by lay agents, who would not be con-
strained by disciplinary rules addressed solely to lawyers).
6. Professor Rubin has made the same point. See Rubin, Institutional Analysis,
supra note 1, at 472-73.
7. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799
(1992).
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executive committee of the AALS's Section on Professional Respon-
sibility thought that framework deserved their attention because, as
Professor Wilkins notes, a bewildering array of institutions now have
often-overlapping claims to regulatory authority in our field.' Hoping
to encourage more scholarship in the area, we asked five scholars to
present papers at the AALS's 1996 Annual Meeting which treat the
Wilkins article as a backdrop to their work, and we invited five more
to respond to those papers. This Symposium presents the work we
commissioned, with an Afterword by Professor Wilkins.
Though each article and accompanying response can be read on
their own, this Foreword is designed to set the stage for readers who
have an interest in the Symposium as a whole. Part I offers an over-
view of the tasks and institutions involved in regulating lawyers. Part
II argues that the field contains fertile soil for legal process analysis.
Part III introduces the Wilkins framework, explains its potential
value, and criticizes it in four respects. Part IV introduces the Sympo-
sium articles and responses, highlighting the points most relevant to
the growth of legal process literature on lawyer regulation.
I. THE COMPLEXrrIES OF LAWYER REGULATION
A. The Multiplicity of Institutions
Lawyer regulation is a complex system involving many institutions.
These institutions sometimes work in tandem, as when a disciplinary
agency uses evidence gathered in an SEC investigation to discipline a
lawyer in his home state.9 But because no czar of lawyer regulation
exists to coordinate their efforts, these institutions also compete for
authority, and sometimes ignore each other. One might divide the
relevant institutions into three classes. One class consists of legal in-
stitutions with broad missions that include some incidental regulation
of lawyers. Judges and juries regulate lawyers through their decisions
in legal malpractice and fee-dispute cases. 10 Congress regulates law-
yers, primarily through antitrust and consumer protection laws,11
through fee caps'" and fee-shifting statutes, 3 and by imposing condi-
8. Id. at 803.
9. See Florida Bar v. Calvo, 630 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1993) (holding that evidence
gathered in SEC investigation is admissable, though not dispositive, in local disbar-
ment proceeding).
10. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
Rutgers L. Rev. 101, 102 (1995) (asserting that legal malpractice law should now be
viewed as "part of the system of lawyer regulation"). For evidence that malpractice
claims against lawyers are more frequent and more evenly spread over the profession
than is commonly supposed, see Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice" The Profes-
sion's Dirty Little Secret, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1657 (1994).
11. See Wolfram, supra note 5, at 38-45.
12. Id. at 522-24.
13. Id at 929-30.
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tions on the delivery of subsidized legal services."4 Trial courts regu-
late litigators through their powers to disqualify counsel, cite for
contempt, impose sanctions for procedural violations, and exclude evi-
dence improperly obtained. 15 To varying degrees, the agencies that
administer the federal tax, patent, immigration, banking, and securi-
ties laws regulate lawyers who practice before them.16
A second set of institutions comes into focus only if one defines
"regulating" in the broad sense of exerting significant influence, even
if not in order to effectuate public policy. By that definition, a number
of private institutions regulate lawyers. The legal services market
"regulates" insofar as clients monitor their lawyers and take reputa-
tion and fees into account in selecting them. Law firms "regulate"
their partners and associates through internal policies and proce-
dures. 7 Watchdog journalists "regulate" lawyers by writing about
them in The American Lawyer and the National Law Journal. And, as
Anthony Davis argues in the Symposium, liability insurers may be
said to "regulate" lawyers by imposing conditions and limits on mal-
practice coverage.' 8
These institutions are part of the gravitational field in which lawyers
operate. To fully understand lawyer regulation, one must keep them
in mind, if only because they have some potential to complement, in-
terfere with, or substitute for institutions that regulate in the strict
sense. As Charles Silver puts the point:
To improve the quality of lawyering, one must change the institu-
tional structures in which lawyers operate .... the incentives and
monitoring arrangements lawyers work under on a daily basis. A
good incentive structure... is worth a pick-up load of... discipli-
nary rules.... [and] it matters little whether an insurance company,
14. l at 936-39.
15. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 (Preliminary Draft No. 12,
1996) (enumerating the judicial remedies available to redress lawyer wrongs).
16. See generally Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Fed-
eral Agencies, 34 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 173 (1984) (criticizing lack of uniformity
among different federal agencies in the regulation of lawyers). At the state level,
courts sometimes strike down, based on separation-of-powers grounds, legislation au-
thorizing administrative agencies to discipline the lawyers who appear before them.
See, e.g., Hustedt v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1981)
(striking down statute granting Workers' Compensation Appeals Board power to sus-
pend or revoke the privilege of attorneys to appear before it as a violaton of the
separation-of-powers doctrine).
17. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt et al., Law Firm Policies Regarding Insider Trading
and Confidentiality, 47 Bus. Law. 235, 238-40 (1991) (reporting that 33 of 40 surveyed
firms maintained policies and procedures to prevent illegal insider trading by their
lawyers and employees, and noting that these policies were developed in response to
federal legislation that authorizes the imposition of administrative sanctions on firms
whose partners or employees engage in insider trading).
18. Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Prac-
tice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 209 (1996) [hereinafter Davis, Insurers as Regulators].
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a bar association, or a lawyer and client bargaining together is re-
sponsible for a particular structural arrangement.'
The third set of relevant institutions consists of bar organizations, or
more precisely, the specialized institutions of professional self-regula-
tion, which have both public and private features. Self-regulatory in-
stitutions have a firmer hold in law than in most occupations.20 The
American Bar Association ("ABA") develops legal ethics codes, most
recently the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and interprets
code rules in advisory ethics opinions.2' The American Law Institute
("ALI") is developing a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,
which is likely to be influential in the courts. 22 Bar agencies certify
lawyers as specialists in certain fields. 3 In most states, the organized
bar, under state supreme court supervision, maintains agencies to li-
cense lawyers and discipline those who violate ethics rules.
Lawyer regulation is complicated by the existence of parallel insti-
tutions at the state and federal levels. Though lawyers are still li-
censed by states, the growth in federal practice is moving federal
institutions closer to the center of the system. 5 The interstate opera-
tions of large law firms and their business clients, coupled with local
variations in the law of lawyering, increasingly produce choice-of-law
problems: the itinerant lawyer must divine whose rules govern her
conduct in any given matter, and courts and agencies must decide
whose rules apply before they can process charges of lawyer wrongdo-
ing.26 The same factors create pressure to federalize regulation, which
19. Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer
Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 233 (1996) [hereinafter Silver,
Response to Davis].
20. See Wolfram, supra note 5, at 20-21; Nancy J. Moore, The Usefidness of Ethical
Codes, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 7, 14-16 (noting that only the legal profession has had
its ethics codes adopted as law).
21. See Wolfram, supra, note 5, at 48-67.
22. For commentary on early drafts of the Restatement, see Symposium: The
Evolving Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 46 OkIa. L Rev. 1 (1993).
23. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(upholding lawyer's right to advertise his certification as trial advocate by private
board); Wolfram, supra note 5, at 201-02 (referring to state bar administered certifica-
tion programs).
24. See Wolfram, supra note 5, at 82-85, In some states, however, state or local bar
associations have lost administrative control of the disciplinary system in favor of
boards established by the state supreme court. See Michael J. Powell. Professional
Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline, 1986 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 31 (discussing such shift in Illinois). An ABA commission has called for simi-
lar reforms elsewhere. See Report of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Discipli-
nary Enforcement xi (1991) (Recommendation 5: Independence of Disciplinary
Officials).
25. See, e.g., Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959, 970 (showing how the federal courts are imposing their view of
proper professional conduct through their enforcement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11).
26. See generally Symposium, Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law,
36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 657 (1995) (discussing the complex ethical questions and conflicting
1996]
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could not only shift authority away from the states, but also from the
judiciary to the other branches. 7
B. The Multiplicity of Tasks
Lawyer regulation is not a unitary task. For one thing, the pressures
and temptations lawyers face vary so much with role, specialty, prac-
tice setting, and clientele that one could make a case for separating or
"contextualizing" regulation along any of these lines. 8 But even if
one assumes, with apologies to Gertrude Stein, that a lawyer is a law-
yer is a lawyer, one must still divide regulation into sub-tasks for the
sake of clarity. The basic sub-tasks are: (1) making rules for law prac-
tice; (2) interpreting rules; (3) detecting rule violations; (4) determin-
ing "guilt" when lawyers are charged with violations; (5) designing
remedies or sanctions; and (6) imposing them in specific cases.
There is no one-to-one correspondence between tasks and institu-
tions. Some tasks are shared, as when the ABA writes ethics codes
and state supreme courts give them legal effect, perhaps amending
them in the process. Many institutions participate in more than one
task. For example, the state supreme courts adopt conduct rules in
ethical obligations that confront lawyers who represent clients in multistate
transactions).
27. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice:
Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 Fordham Urb. LJ. 969 (1992) (an-
alyzing the conflict posed by state ethical codes in federal practice and suggestions for
reform); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 335 (1994) (an-
alyzing sympathetically the case for national rules of professional responsibility that
would be promulgated by Congress). An issue receiving great attention at the mo-
ment is whose ethics rules should govern lawyers practicing in the federal courts and,
if there are to be uniform federal rules, who should formulate them? See, e.g., Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct in the Federal Courts, Report on
Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct, July 5, 1995 (Daniel R. Coquillette, re-
porter) (documenting the great variation in local district court rules and discussing
possible responses); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should
Govern Lawyers and How Should They Be Created?, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 1995) (proposing that the Judicial Conference of the United States develop a
comprehensive and detailed code of ethics for lawyers practicing before all federal
courts). One aspect of the problem is whether to promote uniformity throughout the
federal court system at the expense of uniformity between federal district courts and
the courts of the states in which they sit.
28. Professor Wilkins has supported "contextualized" regulation for lawyers in
several specialty fields. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L.
Rev. 469, 519-23 (1990) (explaining why tax practice calls for contextualized rules);
David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1217-18 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins, Making Context Count]
(same for banking practice); see also Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of
Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 149, 149-50
(1993) (calling for separate ethics codes for various specialties such as securities prac-
tice). Unfortunately, Judge Sporkin does not consider who should draft and enforce
these codes. For the legal process scholar, those would be crucial issues in evaluating
his proposal. Moreover, Judge Sporkin offers no guidance for deciding which special-
ties are the best candidates for separate codes.
[Vol. 65
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the form of ethics codes; hear disciplinary cases in which lawyers are
charged with serious violations; adopt a set of disciplinary sanctions;
and choose the sanction to impose in specific cases. The factors that
bear on their competence to make conduct rules, compared perhaps
to legislators, differ entirely from those that bear on their competence
to determine a lawyer's "guilt" under the rules, compared, say, to ju-
ries, or their competence to sanction violators appropriately. In as-
sessing the competence of a multi-task institution, one must take care
to specify the tasks under review. One should also consider whether
the institution is falling down at one task, not because it is i-designed
for the job, but because the job conflicts with another task.
Take as an example the work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("CEPR"). CEPR's main task is to inter-
pret the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in advisory ethics opin-
ions. Because the Model Rules address the entire bar, they contain
very general standards, e.g., "fees must be reasonable."29 For that
reason, interpretation is an important sub-task in lawyer regulation
and CEPR is an important interpreter, as evidenced by the fact that
Professor Lester Brickman devotes his entire Symposium article to
criticizing a CEPR opinion that refuses to declare unreasonable the
practice of charging a "standard" contingent fee for cases with varying
prospects for success.30
But CEPR has a second task as well. It is expected to recommend
Model Rules changes to the ABA "legislature," the House of Dele-
gates, which may reject its recommendations. 3' According to com-
mentators, some CEPR opinions lack any tenable rationale under the
ethics rules they claim to interpret.32 If this is indeed the case, one
wonders whether CEPR's rulemaking duties could be a source of the
problem; CEPR might be using some opinions as shortcuts to desired,
but politically unattainable, rule changes, or simply devoting too much
time to its legislative agenda.33 Either way, the ABA might consider
29. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) (1995) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
30. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks,
Ethics Walks, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 247 (1996) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingency
Fees].
31. Ted Fmman & Theodore Scbneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opin-
ions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 67, 145 & nn.288-89 (1981).
32. Id. at 146; Lawrence Hellman, When "Ethics" Rules Don't Mean What They
Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions 11-35 (June 14, 1996) (un-
published manuscript, on fie with the Fordham Law Review).
33. In 1990-91, CEPR was dragged into a long and bitter ABA debate, initiated by
the ABA Litigation Section, about whether to amend the Model Rules to ban lawyers
from owning and operating businesses that provide services, such as environmental or
trade consulting, which are "ancillary" to legal services. For an account of the debate,
see Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancil-
lary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 363 (1993). One member pro-
tested that the Litigation Section's crusade against ancillary businesses "has distracted
1996]
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dropping or reassigning CEPR's legislative role in hopes of improving
its ethics opinions.34
C. Institutional Quirks in the Regulation of Lawyers
Having identified the institutions and tasks involved in lawyer regu-
lation, one must grapple with the field's rulemaking quirks. Legisla-
tures or consumer protection agencies make the rules governing
funeral directors, debt collectors-including lawyers qua collectors,35
and many other service providers. When market forces and contracts
alone cannot efficiently govern an occupation or profession, then it
seems wise for elected legislatures or politically accountable agencies
to develop the conduct rules that are needed. After all, the task in-
volves political trade-offs between the interests of providers, clients,
and third-parties. Yet, when it comes to rulemaking for law practice,
where similar trade-offs are surely involved, judges and bar associa-
tions have the greatest influence.36 The Judicial Conference of the
United States writes the rules of procedure that govern lawyers in the
federal courts 7.3  The state supreme courts adopt ethics rules to gov-
ern the lawyers in their jurisdictions and may strike down on separa-
[CEPR] and consumed the major part of its time and energies for the past year as,
faithful to its charge, it has felt compelled to examine the issue afresh to see if a more
appropriate response than the Litigation Section's could be devised." Id. at 366-67
n.20 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Recommenda-
tion and Report to the House of Delegates (May 15, 1991) (Minority Report of Ralph
G. Elliot)).
34. See Hellman, supra note 32, at 38-42 (recommending that CEPR's responsibil-
ities be limited to writing interpretive opinions). To assess this proposal properly
from a comparative institutional standpoint, one would want to know what other
body would take over CEPR's legislative duties and how competent that body would
be at that task. Even if CEPR's legislative role does compromise its performance as
rule interpreter, it does not necessarily follow that reassigning the role would improve
things overall. CEPR's familiarity with ethics rules makes it attractive as an institu-
tion to study and propose amendments.
35. In 1986, Congress amended the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692-1692o, to remove an exemption for attorneys who do collection work for cli-
ents. The Supreme Court subsequently held that attorneys are subject to the Act
even when they collect debts through state litigation. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
1489 (1995).
36. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 20. This is much less true for services such as lobby-
ing, debt collecting, and preparing tax returns or patent applications, which are per-
formed by lawyers and nonlawyers alike.
37. For a rich account of the process by which the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, comprised mostly of judges, drafted a recent round of
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Linda S. Mullenix, Hope
Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69
N.C. L. Rev. 795, 830-50 (1991). Professor Mullinex suggests that the Committee's
process has become such a magnet for interest groups hoping through procedural
amendments to tilt litigation in their favor, that congressional committees may in-
creasingly take over the rulemaking function. She stated:
If [the Committee] does not truly open its processes and meet the concerns
of partisan petitioners, it seems destined to be displaced in the rulemaking
function by Congress .... But if the Advisory Committee does capitulate to
[Vol. 65
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tion-of-powers grounds any conflicting rules that state legislatures or
executive agencies address to lawyers s In adopting ethics rules,
these courts draw heavily on the ABA's model codes.39
None of these bodies develops standards for law practice through
the broad political process that, say, Congress might use. Predictably,
critics complain that rulemaking for law practice is a classic case of
"the fox guarding the henhouse," and thus unacceptable.' They have
a point-until they get to "thus." Bar-made and court-approved rules
may, of course, be biased toward protecting lawyers' interests at the
expense of clients or client interests at the expense of others. From a
comparative institutional standpoint, however, the fox-and-henhouse
critique is no conversation-stopper. The view that legislatures and ex-
ecutive-branch agencies are better occupational rulemakers than
either the judiciary or a peak professional association, however sound
as a generalization, is not necessarily sound when it comes to setting
standards for law practice. The judiciary's expertise, its interest in the
integrity of the legal process, and its legitimate need for independence
from the "political" branches must be considered." Likewise, the
ABA's interest as the nation's peak bar association in being seen as a
body with public duties to speak to lawyers as well as for them, its
interest in promoting respect for lawyers, and its capacity to mobilize
lawyers of all kinds to participate in its debates might, on balance,
justify its legislative role, even though nonlawyers are not directly rep-
resented there.42
lobbying, then it inevitably will compromise its traditional role as promulga-
tor of neutral rules ....
Id. at 855-56.
38. See infra note 41.
39. By 1972, only two years after the ABA issued its Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, most of the state supreme courts had adopted the Code, often verba-
tim, to govern lawyers in their jurisdictions. Report of the ABA Special Commission to
Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. Rep. 268
(1972). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which the ABA adopted in 1983,
have been adopted in over 40 states as the basis for their lawyer codes. ABA/BNA
Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct § 01:3 (1995).
40. See, eg., Jethro K. Lieberman, Crisis at the Bar- Lawyers' Unethical Ethics
and What to Do About It 218 (1978) (criticizing the legal profession's ethical system);
Philip M. Stern, Lawyers on Trial 209 (1980) (exploring the legal profession's
shortcomings).
41. At the state level, the courts have long relied on these considerations not only
to justify their own rulemaking, but to strike down legislative and executive agency
rules governing law practice-even outside the courts-as violations of the separa-
tion-of-powers principle of state constitutional law. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 27-31.
Because no comparably broad principle exists in federal constitutional law, id. at 33,
one might infer that, to the extent regulatory authority shifts from state to federal
government in the future, it will also shift away from courts.
42. I have so argued elsewhere. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics:
The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 677,
678 (1989) [hereinafter Schneyer, Bar Politics] (describing the ABA's production of
the Model Rules as "the most sustained and democratic debate about professional
1996]
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II. Ti- RATIONALE FOR LEGAL PROCESS ANALYSIS OF LAWYER
REGULATION
Given the complexities of the field, why should scholars go through
the trouble of studying issues in lawyer regulation from a legal process
standpoint, as our Symposiasts do? Three reasons come to mind.
First, legal decision makers often act on their own assumptions about
institutional competence. In doing so, they affect the allocation of
regulatory authority. Scholars can isolate this folklore and assess its
validity.
Consider two examples. The first involves the task of designing
remedies or sanctions for lawyer misconduct. In Imbler v.
Pachtman,4 3 the Supreme Court closed one remedial avenue on the
assumption that another was adequate. The Court held that a prose-
cutor is absolutely immune from liability to criminal defendants under
§ 1983 of the federal civil rights laws for his conduct in initiating a
prosecution and presenting the state's case."4 Lest anyone fear that
this immunity leaves prosecutors unacountable for misconduct that in-
fringes on defendants' rights, the Court stressed that the prosecutor is
"unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitu-
tional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an associ-
ation of his peers."45
In other words, Imbler assumes that professional discipline plays a
meaningful role in regulating prosecutors. Yet scholars have found
that prosecutors are almost never disciplined,46 though they surely
commit their share of disciplinable offenses. Perhaps disciplinary bod-
ies treat prosecutors less as lawyers than as officials accountable to the
public through the political process. Maybe they think prosecutors
are adequately policed through still other techniques, such as dismis-
sal of charges, reversal of convictions, or exclusion of ill-gotten evi-
dence. Either way, the rarity of prosecutorial discipline throws the
validity of the Court's argument for civil immunity into doubt.
ethics in the history of the American bar"); id. at 695-97 (describing the ABA's sensi-
tivity to press coverage in the early stages of the Model Rules process).
43. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. at 429. More recently, the Court cut back on the supervisory power of the
federal courts to reverse convictions on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. See
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). The Court again noted the availability
of professional discipline as well as internal discipline by the Justice Department as
alternative and "more narrowly tailored" techniques for controlling prosecutorial mis-
conduct. Id. at 506 & n.5.
46. E.g., Wolfram, supra note 5, at 761; Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecu-
tors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965, 976-79 (1984). For a recent and nega-
tive assessment of the multiple systems for regulating federal prosecutors, particularly
decrying the lack of coordination among them, see Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal
Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 69 (1995).
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The second example involves the task of making conduct rules. De-
bates during the ABA's drafting of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct were studded with assumptions about the competence of
other rulemakers. The ABA Business Law Section pressed for certain
rules concerning lawyers' duties to corporate clients which it hoped
would forestall the SEC from writing its own standards for securities
practice. The Section considered SEC rules too likely, given that
agency's enforcement mission, to turn securities lawyers into unwel-
come compliance monitors and whistle-blowers on their corporate cli-
ents. The ABA adopted the Section's proposals, and the SEC never
made its own rules.47
Similarly, after the ABA approved a Model Rule that bars lawyers
from whistle-blowing on clients who they know through confidences
are about to commit frauds, Senator Arlen Specter tried to amend the
federal mail fraud laws to require disclosure. ' The ABA lobbied suc-
cessfully against the Specter bill on grounds of institutional compe-
tence.4 9 They argued that Congress, as a matter of policy, should
leave even this non-litigation aspect of law practice to the governance
of the state supreme courts, which could be expected to show more
deference than Congress to the ABA rule. 0 On the other hand,
where the alternative rulemaker was a judicial body, it was the ABA
that deferred. In addressing the problem of abusive litigation tactics,
the Model Rules simply track or incorporate the judge-made rules of
civil procedure.51
Because assumptions about the relative competence of the ABA
and other standard setters play a vital role in ABA rulemaking,52 in
turn affecting who makes the rules and thus rule content, scholars
should try to assess their validity.5 3 One might ask, for example, what
47. See Schneyer, Bar Politics, supra note 42, at 706.
48. See id. at 713.
49. See id. at 729-31.
50. Id. at 729-30.
51. Id. at 730.
52. One sign of the ABA's hostility to legislative or executive branch rulemaking
for lawyers was a provision in the comments to Model Rule 1.6. According to the
comments lawyers are ethically entitled to disclose confidential client information
when other law requires disclosure. Whether any particular disclosure law (such as a
child-abuse reporting act) requires disclosure and therefore supersedes the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 "is a matter of interpretation," the comment
states, "but a presumption should exist against such a supersession." Model Rules,
supra note 29, Rule 1.6 cmt. 20. What, one wonders, is the ABA's justification for
commending this canon of statutory construction to judges and other legal decision
makers? For other evidence of the ABA's views on the competence of executive or
legislative bodies to regulate lawyers, see ABA Resolution 103 (Feb. 7, 1989) (resolv-
ing that the ABA opposes the regulation of law practice "by executive or legislative
bodies, whether national, state or local").
53. For a close examination of the discrepancy between the organized bar's and
the "state's" understanding of the relationship between ethics rules and certain ad-
ministrative regulations and statutes that may be inconsistent with those rules but are
1996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
features of Congressional and ABA, or state supreme court, rulemak-
ing bear on their relative competence to make the trade-offs between
protecting client secrets and preventing client frauds that are involved
in formulating lawyers' confidentiality and disclosure duties.
A second rationale for legal process work on lawyer regulation is
that turf wars have broken out on several regulatory fronts lately.
Scholars who understand the strengths and weaknesses of the parties
fighting for jurisdiction can steer them toward a new equilibrium.54
Two articles commissioned for this Symposium try to intervene in
these turf wars. Professor Rory Little discusses the Justice Depart-
ment's ongoing battle with the ABA and the state supreme courts for
control over vital aspects of the work of federal prosecutors. 55 Profes-
sor Richard Painter imagines a contractual regime in which federal
administrative agencies like the SEC could influence law practice in
their fields while avoiding confrontations with the bar,56 which rou-
tinely criticizes any agency rulemaking that might override local ethics
rules.
A third and closely related rationale for legal process scholarship is
that the roles of many pertinent institutions are presently in flux, so
that authority is "up for grabs" as never before and decision makers
will be in the market for relevant policy analysis.57 Take recent devel-
opments in the organized bar and in disciplinary bodies. Within the
bar, the ALI is for the first time developing a Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers.58 This poses a challenge to the ABA's rulemak-
applicable on their face to lawyers, see Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar
and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1389 (1992).
54. For one scholar's effort to "mediate" such a dispute, see Nancy J. Moore, In-
tra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an
End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 515 (1992).
55. Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 355 (1996) [hereinafter Little, Federal Prosecutors).
56. Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the Un-
easy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
149 (1996) [hereinafter Painter, Game Theoretic].
57. One can draw an instructive contrast between the current situation, in which
many institutions regulate lawyers, and the situation early in the century, when the
specialized machinery of professional self-regulation-ethics codes, ethics commit-
tees, and disciplinary bodies-were first developing. Early bar leaders such as Her-
bert Harley of the American Judicature Society argued that those self-regulatory
institutions were needed to fill a regulatory vacuum created by judicial and legislative
indifference. "Harley wrote: 'There must be somewhere in the state or society power
to establish standards of professional conduct with responsibility for enforcing them.
It is easy to understand the practical failure of the courts in this field. And it is too
delicate a matter for legislative control."' Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of
the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, Am. B. Found. Res.
J. 1, 18 n.96 (1983) (quoting Herbert Harley, Group Organizations Among Lawyers,
Annals, May 1922, at 33).
58. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. For a study of the American Law
Institute as a "private legislature," see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995).
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ing primacy; some Restatement positions conflict with the ABA
Model Rules as adopted in many states.5 9 Presumably, the ALI is en-
tering the field because conduct rules are increasingly shaped and ap-
plied in fee litigation, damage suits against lawyers, and
disqualification proceedings. Restatements are addressed to the com-
mon-law judges who preside in those matters. ABA ethics codes pur-
port to address disciplinary authorities. For years, however, judges
have given the ABA codes considerable weight as a source of stan-
dards in fee-dispute, malpractice, and disqualification cases. In some
cases, judges will now be in a position to choose between conflicting
ALI and ABA standards, or to reject both. In making such choices,
judges may fall back on assessments of the relative trustworthiness of
the ALI and ABA as a source of standards.
Let me illustrate the potential value of comparative institutional
analysis to the judges who make these choices. State supreme courts
have adopted Model Rule 1.10(a) as a disciplinary rule. Under that
rule, when one lawyer is barred from representing a new client against
his former client because the matters are related and the former client
has not consented, then others in his firm are barred too, even if the
former representation took place at another firm. On the other hand,
section 204(2) of the Restatement would permit the lawyer's col-
leagues to represent the new client in certain cases if the disqualified
lawyer is screened from participating.60 Suppose a trial judge in a
state whose supreme court has adopted Rule 1.10(a) is asked to dis-
qualify the colleagues of a lawyer who may be properly screened
within the meaning of section 204.61 The judge would have discretion
to choose either conduct rule, unless the state supreme court had indi-
cated that Rule 1.10(a) should apply for non-disciplinary as well as
disciplinary purposes. If the judge does not clearly prefer either rule
on the merits, then she might choose between them on the basis of the
relative competence of the ABA and ALI to balance the interests at
stake.
Here in a nutshell is what comparative institutional analysis might
tell the judge. In deciding whether to permit screening, a rulemaker
59. For example, the Model Rules bar lawyers from advancing loans for personal
expenses to clients they represent in litigation. Model Rules, supra note 29, Rule
1.8(e). But the Restatement authorizes such loans as needed to "enable the client to
withstand delay in litigation that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle or
dismiss a case." Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48(2)(b) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996, as approved June 1996) [hereinafter Restatement].
For one court's effort to grapple with the inconsistency, see Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Smolen, 837 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1992).
60. See Restatement, supra note 59, § 204(2).
61. See Towne Dev. of Chandler, Inc. v. Superior Court, 842 P.2d 1377, 1381-82
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing trial court's denial of disqualification motion and
holding that the matter is governed by Model Rule 1.10 as adopted by the state
supreme court, not by the "countervailing line of thought" that has emerged in the
Restatement).
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must strike a balance between two values: protecting former clients
from the danger that their confidences will slip through a screen and
be used against them and protecting lawyer mobility by allowing con-
flict-carrying lawyers to change firms without "infecting" their new
colleagues. Screening bans disproportionately impair mobility be-
tween larger law firms, which nowadays rely heavily on extensive lat-
eral hiring. Therefore, large-firm lawyers have some bias toward
undervaluing the risks that screening poses for former clients. Elite
lawyers from large firms are more powerful in the ALI, which is
highly selective in choosing members. The ABA is, therefore, the
more competent policy maker on the issue.6'
With law practice ever more specialized, specialty bars also stand to
gain rulemaking or interpretive influence. Thus, the American Col-
lege of Trust and Estate Counsel ("ACTEC") recently published
"commentaries" on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.63
These commentaries may influence trusts-and-estates practice more
than the Model Rules do, because a code addressed to lawyers of
every stripe cannot address trusts-and-estates lawyers with much spec-
ificity. Therefore, projects such as ACTEC's may shift some regula-
tory authority from the general-purpose ABA to a specialty bar. Is
such a shift desirable? Can a specialty bar comment as disinterestedly
as CEPR on the meaning of general conduct rules in its own field? Is
a specialty bar more competent because its members have a deeper
understanding of the field? Such questions invite comparative institu-
tional analysis.
Next, consider the potential impact on the allocation of regulatory
authority of recent developments in professional discipline. Funding
improvements and the professionalization of disciplinary counsel have
produced a shift in disciplinary dockets and sanctioning patterns.
Before 1970, professional discipline did little more than disbar con-
victed felons. It is now used to deter less egregious offenses and to
educate wayward lawyers on ethics rules and office-management
skills, as well as to remove bad apples.65 One might conclude that
disciplinary agencies now have the capacity to deal as well as any leg-
islatively created, consumer-protection agency with low-level "con-
62. I develop this argument more extensively elsewhere. See Ted Schneyer, The
ALI's Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or Compliments?, 46 Okla. L.
Rev. 25, 40-41 (1993).
63. ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 Real
Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 865 (1994). For a similar development in the field of domestic
relations, see American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children:
Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceed-
ings (Nov. 4, 1994).
64. While all disciplinary sanctions are imposed more often than they were in the
1970s, disbarments have risen much more slowly than such lesser sanctions as proba-
tion, the imposition of costs, and restitution orders. See Schneyer, Professional Disci-
pline, supra note 4, at 21-22 & n.129.
65. Id at 21-23.
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sumer" problems.66 Such a finding may stave off the occasional
efforts of the Federal Trade Commission and similar state agencies to
expand their roles in lawyer regulation.
Responding to the growth in large law firms, the New York courts
recently announced a major innovation in disciplinary authority: they
will now treat law firms and not just lawyers as potential disciplinary
targets.6 7 The aim is to encourage firms to maintain policies and su-
pervisory procedures that prevent individual misconduct.' Coupled
with potential reforms in disciplinary sanctions, such as authorizing
disciplinary agencies to impose fines and corrective orders on firms,
this development could enhance the role of professional discipline in
regulating the corporate bar.69 State disciplinary bodies have never
exerted much control over the larger-firm lawyers who predominate
in corporate practice.70 Instead, those lawyers have been governed by
client monitoring, disqualification, trial court sanctions, civil liability,
and enforcement actions by federal agencies. 71 Are those techniques
adequate to the task? Or should we try to redesign disciplinary insti-
tutions to give them a piece of the action?
How the changing balance of power in the bar, the growing sophis-
tication of disciplinary agencies, or other institutional changes will af-
fect the regulatory mix is unclear. But change is in the wind. The
question is whether it will be haphazard, or informed by comparative
institutional analysis.
66. See ABA Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforce-
ment, Report to the House of Delegates 3-4 (May 1991) (concluding on the basis of
survey of lay participants in the disciplinary process for lawyers that legislatively cre-
ated agencies are no more effective than the bar and judicial agencies in regulating
professions).
67. New York Adopts New Rules Subjecting Firms to Discipline, 12 ABA/BNA
Law. Manual Prof. Conduct 191 (current reports, June 12, 1996).
68. Id
69. See Stephen G. Bene, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to
Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 907, 937-38 (1991) (arguing for the
use of fines as a disciplinary sanction). For a critique of the traditional argument
against disciplinary fines, namely that their use would require disciplinary bodies to
give respondents all the protections of criminal procedure, see Schneyer, Professional
Discipline, supra note 4, at 31-33 (pointing out that civil courts and administrative
agencies impose money sanctions on lawyers). The use of potentially substantial fines
as a disciplinary sanction has been under consideration for several years in California.
See infra note 107.
70. During one period in the 1980s, 80 percent of the lawyers disciplined in Cali-
fornia, Illinois, and the District of Columbia practiced alone, and none was in a firm
with more than seven lawyers. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 145 (1989). In
those jurisdictions, however, a substantial percentage of the bar practices in large
firms.
71. See, eg., William B. Glaberson et aL, A Question of Integrity at Blue-Chip Law
Firms: Once Unthinkable Charges of Foul Play are Hitting Prestigious Partnerships,
Bus. Wk., Apr. 7, 1986, at 76 (noting the surprising frequency with which charges of
wrongdoing are nowadays leveled at large law firms in non-disciplinary forums).
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III. PROFESSOR WILKINS'S FRAMEWORK
A. The Framework Described
Who Should Regulate Lawyers? treats lawyer regulation as a com-
plex system. Even so, it does not address every regulatory sub-task.
Rather, it provides a framework for explaining and evaluating our in-
stitutional arrangements for enforcing standards. Enforcement in-
volves the sub-tasks of detecting possible violations, adjudicating
"guilt," and designing and imposing sanctions. Because Professor
Wilkins is only concerned with enforcement-with maximizing lawyer
compliance while minimizing the cost of producing it-he puts aside
issues of rulemaking competence and simply assumes that all enforc-
ers take the ABA codes as the rules to be enforced.72
Professor Wilkins distinguishes between four enforcement systems
or models, which he calls disciplinary, liability, institutional, and legis-
lative controls.73 His models roughly correspond to existing institu-
tions. Judicial agencies or bar associations under judicial supervision
exercise disciplinary control. These agencies rarely use proactive en-
forcement techniques such as random audits or inspections. As a re-
sult, they rarely detect wrongdoing on their own. Instead, they rely on
complaints, mostly from aggrieved clients. The agencies rely on client
complaints even though some ethics rules seem designed to protect
non-clients, while others, such as the ban on commingling lawyers'
and clients' funds, are prophylactic rules whose violation does not in
72. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 810. To isolate the question of enforcement compe-
tence, he writes:
[I]t is necessary to assume a single set of rules that will be ... applied by all
enforcement officials. Because the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and Model Code of Professional Responsibility continue to consti-
tute the most influential sources of professional norms, I assume that all en-
forcement officials agree that lawyers can only be sanctioned for conduct
proscribed in one of these two documents.
Id. Professor Wilkins considers this assumption "exaggerated," but "not completely
unrealistic," and notes that even the SEC, which has shown some interest in making
rules to govern securities lawyers, has "shied away" from rules that contradict the
lawyer's duties under the ABA codes. Id. at 810 n.36. Two SEC lawyers recently
urged that some way be found to make the ethics rules governing securities lawyers
uniform, but they expressed no preference for SEC rulemaking as a solution. Paul
Gonson & John W. Avery, Practicing Securities Law: A Search for Uniformity of
Professional Standards, in ALIIABA Committee on Continuing Professional Educa-
tion, Reforming Legal Ethics in a Regulated Environment 489, 495-97 (Dec. 10, 1993)
(discussing several potential sources of uniform rules, some of which would still rely
on the organized bar). If the SEC were to adopt its own ethics rules for securities
lawyers, it would presumably have to become more involved in ethics enforcement,
perhaps an unwanted task in a time of great budget constraints. Cf. Little, Federal
Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 415, 418-19 (suggesting that one reason the Attorney
General is unlikely to promulgate a comprehensive ethics code for federal prosecu-
tors is that the Justice Department would have to raise the enforcement budget of its
own Office of Professional Responsibility).
73. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 805-09.
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itself harm anyone.74 "Guilt" is usually adjudicated in an administra-
tive proceeding that costs much less than a trial and is funded through
a tax on lawyers. Sanctions range from private admonition to disbar-
ment, but do not include fines or damages, though some lawyers must
make restitution of client funds.75 Like criminal sanctions, discipline
is meant to deter, incapacitate, or even rehabilitate, but does little to
remedy a victim's loss.
Liability controls also operate ex post and at the initiative of vic-
tims. They function by allowing injured parties to sue lawyers under a
variety of statutory and common law theories, including professional
malpractice. Judge and jury adjudicate "guilt" in a trial. Compensa-
tory damages are the key remedy, though punitive damages are some-
times available.76
Institutional controls are exercised by the legal forum before which
a lawyer "appears" for a client. The judge who cites a lawyer for con-
tempt, or sanctions a lawyer for filing a frivolous claim or abusing the
discovery process, exercises institutional control, 77 as does the SEC
when it sanctions a lawyer in an administrative enforcement action for
preparing false disclosure documents for the client to file with the
agency. The court or agency in which a lawyer appears or makes fil-
ings can often detect lawyer wrongdoing on its own, or with the help
of opposing counsel, and has an incentive to do so to protect its own
processes. Forums using institutional controls sometimes impose
sanctions on their own initiative. They can also provide ex ante reme-
dies for the breach of prophylactic rules, as when a trial court grants a
pretrial motion to disqualify a lawyer from a case in which he has a
potential conflict.7"
Finally, legislative controls could be exercised by a legislatively cre-
ated agency with authority to investigate and prosecute lawyer mis-
conduct. State medical and accounting boards are not the only
possible models. The agency could be a more proactive enforcer like
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration-using audits, in-
spections, and reporting requirements to detect violations even of pro-
74. See Model Rules, supra note 29, Rule 1.15(a) (prohibiting the commingling of
lawyer and client funds). Commingling is prohibited not because it is harmful in itself
but because it tempts lawyers to convert client funds to their own use. Any prophy-
lactic rule that is enforced ex ante-before harm occurs-is apt to be enforced in a
non-disciplinary forum, as when a trial court grants a pre-trial motion to disqualify
counsel who is unethically exposing her client to a risk that the lawyer will become
embroiled at trial in a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Tmeo v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854, 856-58
(2d Cir. 1989) (upholding disqualification where criminal defense lawyer might have
to cross-examine a former client who was to testify for prosecution).
75. See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 805-06.
76. See id. at 806-07.
77. See id. at 807-08.
78. See id. at 807-08 & n.30.
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phylactic rules.79 Compared to disciplinary controls, such a proactive
agency might be very expensive, although the more misconduct it de-
terred the fewer cases it would have to investigate and prosecute.80 If
legislative appropriations were used to fund the agency, then some
expense might be externalized to taxpayers who do not use legal serv-
ices, though surely all taxpayers have a stake in the administration of
justice. A proactive agency might be so intrusive as to demoralize
lawyers, force them into wastefully defensive practices, or chill desira-
ble behavior that does not violate the prevailing conduct rules. These
subtle kinds of compliance costs could perhaps be mitigated if the
agency, unlike the SEC or IRS, had no agenda other than to regulate
lawyers.
Using two basic distinctions, Professor Wilkins next develops a ty-
pology of lawyer misconduct. First, he distinguishes breaches of duty
to clients from breaches of duty to third parties or the legal system. In
law-and-economics terms, these are "agency" and "externality"
problems, respectively.8' According to Professor Wilkins, agency
problems include overbilling and neglecting to file a client's claim on
time, while externality problems include filing frivolous claims at a
client's insistence, allowing clients to commit perjury, or helping cli-
ents prepare false tax returns.'
Professor Wilkins also distinguishes between misconduct that oc-
curs in representing corporate clients and the misconduct that occurs
in representing individuals. He does so on the basis of studies show-
ing that most lawyers represent one class or the other and that these
two "hemispheres" of the bar practice under different pressures. Be-
cause sophisticated corporate clients have advantages in selecting, mo-
tivating, and monitoring their lawyers, Professor Wilkins argues,
lawyers who represent corporate clients are relatively likely to create
externality rather than agency problems.8 3
Together, the two distinctions produce four problem sets: corporate
client/agency problems; corporate client/externality problems; individ-
ual client/agency problems; and individual client/externality
problems.' 4 Professor Wilkins's final step is to compare the strengths
and weaknesses of the four enforcement systems in dealing with mis-
conduct in each problem set. 5 Enforcers might use his comparisons
79. See id at 808-09, 847. For a brief account of how such a federal agency might
evolve in the future, see Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back,
60 Fordham L. Rev. 125 (1991).
80. See )Wilkins, supra note 7, at 847-48.
81. Id at 819-20.
82. Id. at 820.
83. See id. at 816-20 for a discussion of agency and externality problems.
84. Id at 819-20.
85. Id at 822-47.
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to recognize and play to their own strengths, 86 to identify types of mis-
conduct better left to others, to steer that misconduct to the best alter-
native enforcer, or to identify internal reforms that might overcome
their weaknesses.
Professor Wilkins thinks no enforcement system can best control all
lawyer misconduct: each system has the advantage in some context,
and an optimal enforcement strategy would combine them.81 He
thinks disciplinary controls deal better than liability controls with the
low-level agency problems that tend to plague individual clients-e.g.,
failures to communicate with the client or to return unearned fees.8
He thinks that the agency problems corporate clients encounter most
are conflicts of interest in litigation, and that such conflicts are best
controlled through disqualification, an ex ante institutional control.89
He thinks disciplinary controls are ill-equipped to deal in any serious
way with externality problems. Clients have no reason to complain
about misconduct that may help them. Third-party victims are less
likely than clients to observe misconduct or realize they have been
harmed. Opposing counsel are reluctant to file stigmatizing discipli-
nary charges against fellow lawyers.90 Disciplinary bodies do little to
86. For example, the Fifth Circuit has relied on Professor Wilkins's view that insti-
tutional controls deal more effectively than disciplinary controls with litigation con-
flicts. In In re American Airlines, 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992), the court disqualified a
litigator for violating conflict-of-interest standards, even though the conflict would not
taint the trial. The court declined to leave the problem for possible ex post enforce-
ment by a disciplinary agency. Id. at 610-11. For discussion of the case, see Bruce A.
Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 Fordham L Rev. 71,
75-79 (1996) [hereinafter Green, The Judicial Role].
87. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 847-51. Contra Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice:
Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 Tul. L Rev. 2583,2591-99 (1996) (propos-
ing that the disciplinary system be dismantled and that liability controls be relied
upon more heavily as a regulatory technique).
88. Id at 874 ("[I]ndividual clients complaining about inattention, low-level negli-
gence, overpayment, or conversion of trust funds will often be better served by the
kind of flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive procedures found in many disci-
plinary agencies than they would be by malpractice suits."). Professor Wilkins con-
cludes that disciplinary agencies should continue to give priority to controlling
individual agency problems, but should become more proactive enforcers, using ran-
dom audits of trust accounts and office procedures, for example, in view of the diffi-
culty that unsophisticated clients face in detecting agency problems. Id. at 874 &
n323. Professor Wilkins is surely right about the advantages of disciplinary controls
over liability controls in this problem cell, but he neglects to mention that disciplinary
controls have only recently become significant in the area. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 65-66. In other words, Professor Wilkins's disciplinary control model is not
a timeless ideal-type; it is historically contingent. If disciplinary controls have
changed substantially since 1970, there is no reason why they cannot change again
over the next quarter-century.
89. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 827-28, 832 (arguing that the prospect of disqualifica-
tion has done much more to encourage large firms to develop effective conflict avoid-
ance procedures than has the prospect of professional discipline). However, large
firms become embroiled in conflicts not only in litigation, but also in transactional
work, where no institutional controls may apply.
90. Id. at 822-24.
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ferret out misconduct on their own. And they offer no useful remedy
to non-clients.91
Professor Wilkins thinks institutional controls are often the best ap-
proach to externality problems because the forum in which a lawyer is
working can detect such problems on its own, or with opposing coun-
sel's help, and has an incentive to do so in order to protect its own
processes.92 He thinks liability controls, with their promise of dam-
ages, are the best device for dealing with agency problems that impose
large and provable losses on individual clients.93 He also thinks liabil-
ity controls deal better than disciplinary controls with externality
problems, including those that arise in corporate practice. 94 He ap-
pears to think there is systemic underenforcement in that area, and
would favor legislation and judicial decisions that expand the rights of
third parties to sue lawyers for damages.95
Thus, by breaking lawyer misconduct into sub-categories, Professor
Wilkins is able to reach a number of reasoned conclusions about the
strengths and weaknesses of his four enforcement systems. To the ex-
tent his systems correspond to today's institutions, his framework also
helps explain why those institutions play the limited roles they do-
why, for example, disciplinary agencies mostly protect individual cli-
ents with small-stakes claims.
91. Id- at 834.
92. Ld. at 835-38. On the other hand, Professor Wilkins worries that institutional
controls may sometimes over-deter conduct that is entirely proper. He argues, for
example, that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has too often been used
to sanction resource-starved lawyers for civil rights plaintiffs, who are in no position
to exhaustively review the merits of the complaints they file. Id. at 839-41. He also
suggests that the SEC, anxious to enlist private securities lawyers as watchdogs on
their own clients, has at times engaged "in what appears... to be overzealous en-
forcement" through its own institutional controls. IL at 836.
93. Id. at 830-32. These clients can afford access to the malpractice system thanks
to the contingent fee. Of course, liability controls cannot effectively deter lawyers
who know at the time of their misconduct that they are likely to be judgment-proof if
they are caught. They could also encourage lawyers to engage in too much "defensive
lawyering." Although Professor Wilkins recognizes that clients sometimes file unmer-
itorious malpractice claims against their insured lawyers in order to capitalize on the
considerable nuisance value of those suits, he sees little reason for concern that liabil-
ity controls produce undue enforcement costs in the form of wastefully defensive
lawyering. Id. at 831-32 n.132. And he thinks corporate clients monitor their lawyers
closely enough to keep defensive lawyering, such as taking endless depositions to
avoid charges of negligence, to a minimum. Id. at 833.
94. See id. at 833-35, 869-72. Professor Wilkins's most explicit statement on the
point is ambiguous. Liability controls, he writes, "appear likely to address a broad
range of [externality problems] that ... fall outside the present disciplinary system."
l at 835. "Likely to address" is not the same as "likely to deal with better;" the cure
could be worse than the disease. Nonetheless, Professor Wilkins's sympathy for ef-
forts to expand third-party liability is clear from the tenor of the passages cited.
95. Id. at 830-35. In common-law malpractice cases, courts have traditionally used
the privity barrier to keep many third-party claims out of court, although they increas-
ingly recognize a third-party right to sue for negligent misrepresentation. Wolfram,
supra note 5, at 223-26.
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B. The Framework Criticized
Professor Wilkins's analysis of who should regulate lawyers is open
to four general criticisms. First, even if one accepts his enforcement
"rankings," as I shall, one wonders how useful they can be to the deci-
sion makers whose choices affect the regulatory mix. The general ob-
servation that one enforcement system is better suited than another to
deal with a category of problems hardly shows that it deals better with
all aspects of all cases in the category, that the superior system's role
should be increased, or that the inferior system's role should be de-
creased. Thus, even if liability controls do prevent, detect, and rem-
edy vastly more misconduct than disciplinary controls in the
corporate-externality area, disciplinary controls still do a better job of
imposing the sometimes indispensable sanction of disbarment on law-
yers who are caught helping corporate clients defraud investors. After
all, only disciplinary authorities can disbar. Moreover, the advantages
of liability controls in deterring, detecting, and remedying corporate
externality problems do not imply that courts should expand lawyers'
liabilities to third-party victims, unless one can show that the courts
have limited third-party liability on the mistaken assumption that dis-
ciplinary controls deal effectively with externality problems. Nor do
those advantages imply that the lawyers' disciplinary agency in New
York City should reduce the percentage of its budget that goes to in-
vestigating and prosecuting misconduct in the corporate externality
sphere.
Second, Professor Wilkins's misconduct categories are not always
helpful. The agency/externality distinction makes little sense as ap-
plied to some problems. As Professor Little suggests, it is difficult to
label most prosecutorial misconduct in these terms.96 One cannot say
whether overzealous prosecution or abuse of a defendant's rights is
only an externality problem, harming the defendant and perhaps the
criminal process, or is also an agency problem because the prosecutor
owes a duty to his client, the people, to protect the defendant's
rights. 7 However one labels prosecutorial misconduct, the key point
is that prosecutors' clients are unlikely to trigger any of Professor Mil-
kins's enforcement systems. Likewise, as Professor Bruce Green
points out, one could treat certain conflicts of interest as externality
problems, but Professor Wflkins treats them solely as agency
problems.9" The lawyer who abuses a former client's confidences in
96. Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 416.
97. See Model Rules, supra note 29, Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the re-
sponsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsi-
bility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice .... "). Perhaps due to this complication, Professor Wtlkins has
nothing to say about who should enforce conduct rules addressed to prosecutors. See
Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 357-58.
98. Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 88-89; Wilkins, supra note 7, at 88-
89.
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order to zealously represent his current client is betraying a former
client, an agency problem. But the lawyer is also harming a present
non-client in order to serve a client's needs-an externality problem.
Similarly, the distinction between lawyers who represent individuals
and those who represent companies masks some differences among
lawyers even as it highlights others. Professor Wilkins admits, for ex-
ample, that a one-shot lawyer for a "mom and pop" company is apt to
behave more like an individual-client lawyer than a lawyer for Gen-
eral Motors,9 9 and conversely, that "the relationship between de-
throned investment banking czar Michael Milken and his principal
lawyer Arthur Liman ... probably more closely resembles interac-
tions between Drexel Burnham and its lawyers than [it resembles] the
experience of most individual criminal defendants."'100
These category problems, though real, should not be overempha-
sized. Analysis requires categories, and endlessly subdividing one's
categories does not necessarily enhance their policymaking or explan-
atory value. In his empirical study of white-collar criminal defense
work in New York,' Kenneth Mann shows that lawyers for white-
collar defendants like Michael Milken do indeed face different incen-
tives than their street-crime counterparts. 0 2 But, although he tries to
draw policy implications from this,0 3 Mann suggests no ways in which
white-collar defense lawyers should be regulated differently; his sub-
categories are too refined for that.
My third criticism of Professor Wilkins's analysis is that he some-
times treats one enforcement system as if it were immutable, another
as evolving or at least open to change. It is all too easy to "fudge" the
calculus of advantage between two enforcement systems by imagining
plausible changes in one but not the other. Thus, in discussing the
role of liability controls in dealing with externality problems, Profes-
sor Wilkins imagines and even seems to anticipate that courts will ex-
pand third-party rights to sue lawyers.1° But in discussing the role of
disciplinary controls, he cannot conceive of comparable adaptations.
Instead, he treats the very reforms that could beef up disciplinary con-
trols to deal with externality problems as features of a proactive, and
non-existent, system of legislative controls.
In fact, however, where corporate-practice externalities are con-
cerned, liability controls have arguably contracted since Professor
99. See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 819 n.83.
100. Idt at 819.
101. Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at
Work (1985).
102. I& at 4-5.
103. Id. at 243-50.
104. Wilkins, supra note 7, at 834 (arguing that, because "blue-chip" law firms are
"usually involved in the kind of transactions that pose a significant risk of harming
large numbers of consumers or investors, the volume of third party actions involving
leading law firms appears destined to increase").
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Wilkins's article appeared. California, once generous in allowing
third-party victims to recover for professional negligence, has become
more restrictive. 10 5 The Supreme Court recently terminated an im-
portant liability control on securities lawyers, holding that the an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not entitle investors
to bring secondary liability, e.g., aiding and abetting, claims against
lawyers who assist corporate clients in securities frauds. 11 And many
of the firms that represent corporate clients have reorganized as lim-
ited liability entities so that partners will not be vicariously liable
when one member of the firm incurs liability. 07
At the same time, disciplinary controls are gaining power to pro-
ceed against law firms as entities and to impose fines as a disciplinary
sanction.10 Perhaps they also could develop more proactive detection
techniques and structural remedies, which would further expand their
capacity as corporate-externality problem enforcers. °9 Of course, I
am not holding my breath. But the point remains that disciplinary or
self-regulatory controls are not inherently unable to deal with exter-
nality problems in corporate practice. Consider analogies from other
professions. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
maintains a system for overseeing the practices of accounting firms in
conducting audits,"' and self-regulating stock exchanges deal with
both externality and agency problems in the securities business."'
My final criticism is that Professor Wilkins's sharp separation of en-
forcement from rulemaking distorts our understanding of some insti-
105. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 761 (Cal. 1992) (declining to
permit all merely foreseeable third-party users of audit reports to sue the accounting
firm that performed the audit on a theory of professional negligence).
106. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. CL 1439, 1455 (1994). Professor
Wrlkins would presumably decry the Central Bank decision on grounds of enforce-
ment policy, though he does express some concern that secondary liability might in-
duce securities lawyers to overinvest in preventing client fraud, thereby driving up
fees, or to refuse to represent the less reputable businesses that might be most in need
of legitimate services. See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 835.
107. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 10, at 142 (stating that in the wake of the sav-
ings and loan crisis "[s]o many firms have taken advantage of professional corpora-
tion and similar statutes, that little may soon remain of vicarious liability in practice").
108. See supra note 67 (discussing the authorization of law-firm discipline in New
York); see also Disciplined Lawyers Ordered to Pay Costs of Proceedings to the Bar,
Cal. St. BJ., Mar. 1994, at 26 (indicating that California State Bar recently came out
in favor of reforms authorizing the imposition of fines up to $5000 per violation and
$50,000 per proceeding as a disciplinary sanction in certain cases).
109. For an account of how the lack of these powers contributed to the inability of
state disciplinary authorities to respond to the alleged misconduct of the large law
firms who had represented thrift institutions such as Lincoln Savings before they
failed, see Schneyer, supra note 5, at 643-50.
110. A-A. Sommer, The Accounting Profession's Peer Review Program, 20 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 375, 376-77 (1989). Because third-party lenders and investors often rely on
audits, the danger that poor audits will produce externality problems is substantial.
111. For a description of the New York Stock Exchange's disciplinary system, see
David P. Doherty et al., The Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Exchange, 85
Nw. U. L. Rev. 637, 637-38 (1991).
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tutional choices. In one instance, it impels Professor Wilkins to
analyze a decision that arguably chooses between rulemakers as a
choice between enforcers. In Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes
& Holt,"' the Seventh Circuit held that a law firm was not secondarily
liable under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws for failing
to warn investors when the firm learned that its former client was per-
petrating a fraud in connection with a securities issue briefly worked
on by the firm."' Finding no ethics rule or fiduciary standard that
imposed a duty to warn,"4 the court asserted that the securities laws
"must lag behind changes in ethical and fiduciary standards," and that
"an award of damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze
the trail toward improved ethical standards.""11 5
Professor Wilkins criticizes Barker, arguing that the court failed to
recognize that iability controls are essential for corporate-practice ex-
ternality problems." This argument assumes that the defendant law
firm breached a conduct rule. 1 7 But the court's point was that no
such rule exists and that the court should not invent one by reading it
into the securities laws. To the extent that Barker makes an institu-
tional choice, it is a choice between rulemakers for securities practice,
not enforcers.
Professor Wilkins senses that although the sub-tasks involved in
lawyer regulation are analytically separable, they can be very "sticky"
in reality. He puts the twin tasks of adjudicating guilt and sanctioning
violators under one "enforcement" heading for the good reason that
guilt-adjudicating institutions normally mete out sanctions as well.
Professor Wilkins also has no trouble recommending institutional con-
trols for litigation conflicts without showing that they are better than
disciplinary controls at the sub-task of adjudicating guilt; for him it is
enough that disqualification is superior to disciplinary sanctions."18
112. 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 497. Recently, the Supreme Court held that investors have no right to
recover damages from a law firm for aiding and abetting a client's violation of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114
S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994).
114. Barker, 797 F.2d at 497.
115. Id.
116. See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 850 ("[F]rom the perspective of enforcing the
rules of professional conduct, it is a mistake to place additional obstacles in the path
of this kind of third party enforcement system." (footnote omitted)).
117. Wilkins invokes the "widely acknowledged professional norm" that lawyers
should "refuse to participate in fraudulent conduct even when they are not at liberty
to disclose the wrongdoing." lI& at 849. This is a fair restatement of the ban on assist-
ing a client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Model Rules, supra
note 29, Rule 1.2(d). But Wilkins never explains how the defendant law firm "partici-
pated in" or knowingly "assisted" fraud. The rule seems inapplicable to the facts of
the case.
118. See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 828 n.113. Reasons for enforcing conflicts rules
ex ante through disqualification include the trial court's interest in the integrity of its
own processes, the value of remedying a conflict before it taints a trial, and perhaps
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Yet he completely detaches the rulemaking and enforcement tasks
and focuses on enforcement alone. This not only leaves him speech-
less on issues of rulemaking competence; it leaves him unable to ac-
count for situations where an institution may take on enforcement
duties, not because it is a better enforcer per se, but because it has
perceived rulemaking advantages and will have to enforce its rules on
its own.1
19
Conduct rules vary not only in content but in specificity. Some in-
stitutions are good at general rules but weak at specification. As Pro-
fessor Fred Zacharias has argued,2 0 ABA ethics codes addressed to
the entire bar are weak at specifying rules for specialized fields of
practice.' When the need for specificity becomes acute, rulemaking
authority may shift from the ABA and the state supreme courts to an
institution better suited to develop specific rules or "protocols." Some
shift in enforcement may occur as a result.
Consider the regulatory response to the law firms that represented
Lincoln Savings shortly before it failed. Federal banking authorities
sought huge recoveries from Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Kaye,
Scholer, Ferman, Hays & Handler for their alleged misconduct in
representing Lincoln Savings. The government claimed that lawyers
at the firms violated a number of ethical duties, not just arcane bank-
ing regulations.1 2 Discretion being the better part of valor, the law
firms settled for millions of dollars,'" even though the government's
the difficulty of later assessing the harm caused by a conflict in an ex post malpractice
suit. For reasons why disqualification may sometimes be an unsuitable response to
litigation conflicts, see Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 84-95.
119. A good example, discussed in this Symposium by Professor Little, is the Attor-
ney General's recent promulgation of a preemptive regulation governing the author-
ity of federal prosecutors to contact defendants or investigative targets who are
represented by counsel and whose lawyers do not consent to the contact. See 59 Fed.
Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R § 77) (final rule regarding Communi-
cations with Represented Persons). The rule reflects the Justice Department's assess-
ment that the ABA, local bar authorities, and some federal courts were interpreting
rules such as Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct inconsistently and
in a way that hampered legitimate law enforcement techniques. The rule not only sets
standards more acceptable to the Department, it also vests interpretive and enforce-
ment authority in the Department itself (through its Office of Professional Responsi-
bility) and ousts local disciplinary authorities and the federal courts themselves as
enforcers of Rule 4.2. See Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 375-77.
120. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L Rev. 223 (1993).
121. See id. at 224-25.
122. See In re American Continental CorpJLincoln Savings & Loan Sec. Litig., 794
F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992) (denying defendant law firm's motion for summaryjudgment and suggesting that a law firm may have to inform its client when it learns
that the client is breaking the law and may be required to withdraw if the conduct
persists); In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992) (Notice of Charges and of
Hearing for Cease and Desist Orders to Direct Restitution and Other Appropriate
Relief) (listing 10 claims brought against Kaye, Scholer).
123. See Steve France, Unhappy Pioneers: S&L Lawyers Discover a "New World"
of Liability, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 725, 726 (1994). All told, the government insti-
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novel and controversial reading of ethical norms might well have been
rejected if litigated.'24 The very general tenor of ethics rules made the
allegations plausible enough to bring the law firms and their insurers
to their knees. 125
When the in terrorem effects of vague ethical norms become great,
as they did in the government's liability suits and enforcement actions,
lawyers and regulators alike become interested in creating "protocols"
that put lawyers on clear notice of their duties and function as "safe
harbors" for those who comply.'2 6 Thus, in settling their cases, the
law firms agreed to abide by such protocols in future banking work. 127
The federal banking agencies could turn those protocols-i.e., prophy-
lactic rules too banking-specific to ever make their way into an ABA
ethics code-into conduct rules for all lawyers engaged in banking
practice."z If that should happen, then the agencies would presuma-
bly enforce those rules in their own administrative proceedings.
tuted over 90 civil or administrative actions by 1993 against the law firms that repre-
sented failed thrifts. Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan
Crisis, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 53, 53.
124. A special ABA task force sharply contested the regulators' interpretations of
lawyers ethical obligations under the Model Rules. ABA Working Group on Lawyers'
Representation of Regulated Clients, Laborers in Different Vineyards?: The Banking
Regulators and the Legal Profession 141-213 (Discussion Draft Jan. 1993) [hereinafter
Working Group Representation]. The task force went so far as to urge the banking
agencies to submit "novel or non-traditional interpretations of professional codes" to
the ABA or to state bars for "authoritative rulings" before acting on those interpreta-
tions. Id. at 12 (Recommendation 9).
125. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 5, at 650-65 (demonstrating
the indeterminacy of the Model Rules as they bear on the validity of the regulators'
charges); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer" Enlisting Lawyers to Im-
prove the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1019, 1029 (1993)
("The substantial ambiguity inherent in current standards of professional conduct
makes it all but impossible to resolve retrospectively the disputes between the govern-
ment and defenders of the private bar." (footnote omitted)).
126. For an economist's explanation of how the heavy and uncertain liabilities asso-
ciated with ex post regulation can prompt regulators and regulatees to accept an alter-
native regime of specific prophylactic rules and ex ante monitoring for compliance, see
Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input
and Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 193, 196-97 (1977). Wittman notes, for exam-
ple, that society, being unwilling to accept the costs of regulating automobile driving
solely by imposing liability on drivers after they "negligently" or "recklessly" cause
accidents, imposes speed limits and enforces them in cases where no accident has
occurred. Idl
127. For example, Kaye, Scholer accepted the following protocols, among others,
for its future banking work: Kaye, Scholer must review the finances of every new
banking client and come to a written understanding with each banking client about
the scope of its engagement. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-24 4, 11 (Mar. 11, 1992)
(Order to Cease and Desist for Affirmative Relief from Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
& Handier). Any legal opinions concerning a banking client's compliance with fed-
eral banking law must be prepared under the supervision of a partner with at least 10
years of experience in the field and must be approved by a second banking partner.
Id.
128. At times, the OTS has indicated that it considers the agreed-upon protocols
with Kaye, Scholer and other firms to be "'general principles"' that the OTS expects
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IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES AND
RESPONSES
One measure of the value of Who Should Regulate Lawyers? is its
capacity, amply demonstrated in this Symposium, to stimulate other
scholars to search for legal process insights in their work on the law of
lawyering. I want now to introduce those Articles and Responses, ty-
ing them to Professor Wilkins's analysis.
A. Green on Institutional Control of Litigation Conflicts
Professor Green's article, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Ju-
dicial Role, rethinks the role of the trial courts in regulating the con-
flicts of interest that arise in litigation. Professor Green agrees with
Professor Wilkins that such conflicts tend to arise in corporate litiga-
tion, that disciplinary agencies play no real role in policing them, and
that institutional controls by the trial courts themselves are likely to
be more effective.12 9 At the same time, he challenges Professor Wil-
kins's analysis in several respects.
Professor Wilkins rests his case for institutional controls on the su-
periority of disqualification over the traditional disciplinary sanc-
tions.130 But this lumps sanctions, which are meant to deter or punish
misconduct, with remedies, which also deter, but are designed to re-
dress or avert the harm that misconduct causes. Professor Green
thinks disqualification is an appropriate remedy for some litigation
conflicts, but never appropriate as a pure sanction. 31 After all, the
chief burdens of disqualification are likely to fall on the disqualified
lawyer's client, who will have to start over with new counsel, and on
the court, because of the resulting delays. If the party moving for dis-
qualification cannot show substantial harm, Professor Green argues,
there is no good reason to burden these innocent parties.132
On these grounds, Professor Green criticizes a much-discussed deci-
sion that disqualified a law firm five years into the litigation. 33 The
disqualified firm was proceeding against IBM, allegedly without its
consent and while representing IBM in unrelated matters. 3" Ethics
rules generally forbid lawyers to represent one client against another
current client without the latter's consent, even when the matters the
firm is handling for that client are unrelated to the case at hand. 35
all banking lawyers to follow. Wlkins, Making Context Count, supra note 28, at 1169
n.104 (1993) (quoting Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS, Regulatory Actions Against
Lawyers 1 (Aug. 10, 1992)).
129. Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 72, 87-88.
130. See Wlldns, supra note 7, at 828.
131. Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 72-73.
132. Id. at 90-91.
133. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
134. See Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 83-84.
135. See Model Rules, supra note 29, Rule 1.7(a). Texas has rejected this broad
prohibition, presumably on the theory that where the representations are unrelated
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The court made no finding that IBM was harmed or likely to be
harmed as a result of this conflict, or that the conflict would "taint"
the litigation. 136 In Professor Green's view, the court unwisely dis-
qualified the firm as a sanction, not a remedy.137
If disqualification should only be used as a remedy-e.g., to avoid
the risk that a former client's confidences will be used against it-and
if the case for institutional controls rests on the supposed value of
disqualification as a sanction, then one might expect Professor Green
to reject the broad use of institutional controls to regulate litigation
conflicts. Yet Professor Green still favors institutional controls. Even
when disqualification is unnecessary to redress or avert harm, or un-
desirable because the burdens of disqualification on the innocent cli-
ent and the court would outweigh the harm to the moving party from
continued representation, Professor Green would still have the courts
impose "pure" sanctions, such as public censure or Rule 11-type fines,
rather than relegate the problem to disciplinary controls. 1 s This
would require little judicial effort beyond the disqualification hearing
that would already have been held, and would teach lawyers that a
refusal to disqualify does not imply approval of their conduct. 39
Finally, Professor Green thinks one cannot disregard the making of
conduct rules when one tries to define the proper role of trial judges
in policing litigation conflicts. Unlike Professor Wilkins, he sees a
close link between the tasks of making and enforcing rules in this
area.14 0 He regards ethics rules governing conflicts as largely prophy-
lactic rules, rules whose violation need not imply harm. Because dis-
qualification is appropriate only where present or future harm is
shown, those rules should be rejected in favor of balancing tests devel-
oped by courts and applied on case-by-case basis.141
Professor Green rejects the use of ethics rules as disqualification
standards because those rules are largely addressed, not to the courts,
but to the lawyer who must decide whether to accept a new client.
The lawyer's natural bias in favor of accepting new business calls for
the risk of harm is remote. Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes
179-80 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1996). Further, legal scholar Tom Morgan has re-
cently criticized the rule on similar grounds. See Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current
Client, 9 Georgetown J. Leg. Ethics (forthcoming 1996).
136. Levin, 579 F.2d at 283 (indicating that no specific injury to the moving party
had been shown).
137. See Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 84-85.
138. Id. at 90-91. Interestingly, while Professor Green treats money sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as a model for his proposal, recent amend-
ments to Rule 11 are likely to result in more trial courts referring Rule 11 violations
to disciplinary authorities rather than imposing sanctions themselves. See Jeffrey A.
Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 37
(1993).
139. Green, The Judicial Role, supra note 86, at 91-94.
140. Id at 71-73.
141. Id at 129.
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conduct rules that, if anything, err on the side of discouraging repre-
sentation, because the cost to a would-be client of having to go else-
where is often minimal. Disqualification standards, by contrast, are
addressed to disinterested judges and applied after the litigation client
and the court have become invested to some degree in the lawyer's
participation in the case.' 42
As Professor Susan Martyn comments, 143 Professor Green wants to
"bifurcate" the judicial scrutiny of an alleged litigation conflict into
two phases-an inquiry into whether to disqualify under judge-made
standards and, if disqualification is rejected on the insufficient-harm
principle, an inquiry into whether to impose personal sanctions for
ethics-rule violations."' Professor Martyn worries that this will con-
fuse lawyers or encourage unsavory strategic behavior. Because Pro-
fessor Green's proposal would reduce disqualifications and would
result in serious personal sanctions only when a lawyer had deliber-
ately flouted the ethics rules, a cynical litigator might forgo conflicts
checks in choosing new clients and hope that any personal sanctions
later incurred would be minimal.145
Professor Martyn would continue to use disqualification broadly
and would encourage the courts to impose more fee forfeitures as an
institutional control on litigation conflicts as well. 46 She also ques-
tions Professor Green's distinction between harmful and harmless
conflicts: 14 7 even in Professor Green's "paradigmatic" no-harm case,
she thinks IBM was at least arguably harmed, because the law firm
deprived the company of its right to withhold consent or, in the alter-
native, to consent but monitor the firm's unrelated work on its behalf
more closely in light of the conflict. 4s
142. Id. at 110-11.
143. Susan R. Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role in Controlling Litigation Con-
flicts: Response to Green, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 131 (1996) [hereinafter Martyn. Re-
sponse to Green].
144. Id. at 133-34.
145. Id. at 137.
146. Id. at 147.
147. Id. at 140. Professor Martyn casts Professor Green's distinction between
harmful and harmless conflicts as a distinction between actual and potential conflicts.
Id. at 139. I disagree. Professor Green recognizes that disqualification may be war-
ranted when the court finds a significant risk of future harm (such as through im-
paired representation or misused confidences), even if no harm has yet occurred. But
he rejects the notion that all litigation conflicts prohibited by the ethics rules are
harmful per se or carry a serious risk of harm. Green, Tie Judicial Role, supra note
86, at 99-103. He does not regard the moving client's mere perception that the lawyer
has been disloyal in taking on the new client as tangible enough to qualify as signifi-
cant harm. Id. at 104-09.
148. See Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role, supra note 143, at 134-35.
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B. Painter on Institutional Controls by Federal Agencies
Many federal agencies have authority to discipline lawyers who
practice before them, but they rarely exercise these institutional con-
trols.149 From time to time, however, one agency or another has
briefly tried to develop an activist regime that would not only disci-
pline lawyers for violating the ethics rules that prevail in their home
states,'50 but would impose and enforce the agency's own conduct
rules or own interpretation of the state rules. Agency rules or inter-
pretations have arguably been inconsistent with ABA or home-state
ethics rules, and, to make matters worse, agencies have tried at times
to enforce them without first promulgating them as rules or policy
statements. The SEC showed signs of developing such a regime in the
1970s and 1980s.' 51 Federal banking agencies, notably the OTS, did
the same in the wake of the savings and loan crisis.152 In each in-
stance, the agencies met with sharp resistance by the organized bar,
which questioned the agencies' authority to create such a regime.'53
This agency approach, Professor Painter argues, may doom regulators
to an "indefinite struggle with a recalcitrant bar.' 54
Professor Painter's ambitious and highly theoretical project is to de-
ploy the insights of game theory and Coasian economics, not just to
understand these agency-bar disputes, but to learn how to avoid them,
while at the same time improving agency regulation of business
through institutional controls on lawyer behavior. 55  Professor
Painter starts with three premises. One is that lawyers who deal re-
peatedly with an agency like the SEC have much to gain by cultivating
a reputation for being cooperative and trustworthy. The second is
that society stands to gain by promoting cooperation between regula-
tors and regulated businesses rather than evasion by business and har-
149. For example, from the Federal Communications Commission's inception in
1934 until 1991, it has had only two disciplinary hearings. Painter, Game Theoretic,
supra note 56, at 170 n.73.
150. To my knowledge the only agencies that have their own ethics codes for the
practitioners who appear before them are agencies before which non-lawyers as well
as lawyers practice "law." These include the Internal Revenue Service and the Patent
and Trademark Office. See Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R.
§ 10 (1995) (promulgating rules of practice before the IRS); Practice Before the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, 37 C.F.R. § 10 (1995) (promulgating rules of practice
before the PTO).
151. For a brief treatment, see Painter, Game Theoretic, supra note 56, at 181-83.
152. See id. at 186-84.
153. For the harsh response of the ABA Business Law Section to SEC moves in the
direction of making conduct rules for lawyers, see Statement of Policy Adopted by
American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in
Advising with Respect to the Compliance By Clients with Laws Administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. Law. 543 (1975). For the ABA re-
sponse to the OTS's efforts, see ABA Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of
Regulated Clients, supra note 122.
154. Painter, Game Theoretic, supra note 56, at 186-87.
155. See id. at 1-2.
[Vol. 65
FOREWORD
assment by government. The third is that lawyers' reputational
interests can be used to promote such cooperation.5 6
Professor Painter proposes that individual law firms enter into en-
forceable contracts with agencies to abide by mutually agreeable con-
duct rules, rather than being obliged to follow an "immutable set of
standards" imposed on all lawyers from above.157 By negotiating tai-
lored rules, law-firms could differentiate themselves from other firms
and earn firm-specific reputations.
"Tailored" standards negotiated ex ante-before representation-
would be clearer than the one-size-fits-all standards found in an ABA
or state ethics code. Because they are negotiated, they would not
force lawyers to disobey ethics rules in their home states. One law
firm might practice before the SEC under a commitment to resign or
blow the whistle on a law-breaking client, while another might operate
on the understanding that its lips would remain sealed. If a law firm
committed itself to higher-than-minimum diligence and disclosure,
which would signal that its clients were committed to cooperating with
the agency, the agency would commit itself to mutual cooperation. In-
deed, the firm's clients would receive "favorable regulatory
treatment."'158
Some negotiated rules might resemble the protocols that Kaye,
Scholer negotiated with the OTS in the consent agreement that settled
the government claims against the firm arising from the Lincoln Sav-
ings failure. 159 The firm might agree, for example, that two exper-
ienced partners would sign off on any legal opinion the firm rendered
as to whether the client was in compliance with agency rules. These
protocols would simply supplement or elaborate upon general ethical
norms. Other negotiated rules, such as a commitment to whistle-blow,
might be at odds with current duties of loyalty or confidentiality. But,
Professor Painter insists, lawyers must be permitted to "contract out
of' ethics rules that "unduly narrow" their ability to police a client's
commitment to cooperate with the agency.160 The agency would en-
force the law firm's commitments in its own disciplinary proceedings,
using a range of sanctions, including warnings, thereby not relying
only on the "big sticks" of huge monetary sanctions and debarment
from all agency work.' 6'
Many questions spring to mind about the feasibility and desirability
of Professor Painter's intriguing scheme. One wonders, for example,
just how a law firm or its clients will enforce the agency's commitment
156. See id. at 150.
157. Id. at 152.
158. Id at 188.
159. See id. at 188-89. For discussion of those protocols, see supra note 127 & ac-
companying text.
160. Painter, Game Theoretic, supra note 56, at 187-88.
161. Id. at 193-200.
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to provide "favorable treatment" to the clients of a law firm whose
tailored rules call for above-minimum diligence and disclosure.
Would not the agency's commitment also have to be spelled out in
clear understandings? May an agency promise "most-favored-regu-
latee" status to the clients of some lawyers but not others, or would
that violate principles of administrative fairness? Would each client
have to consent to representation in light of its law firm's commit-
ments to the agency? Can a client effectively consent in advance to
representation that waives some of its rights to loyalty and confidenti-
ality? 162 If such waivers are not permissible under current ethics rules,
then presumably those rules would have to be amended to turn pres-
ently indefeasible rights into default rules, waivable by agreement be-
tween lawyer, client, and agency.
Responding to Professor Painter's Article, Professor Ian Ayres,
whose own applications of game theory to regulation was an inspira-
tion for Professor Painter's project, raises some of these questions. In
particular, Professor Ayres wonders whether clients would have to
consent to their lawyer's following conduct rules negotiated between
the lawyer and the agency. 163 Somewhat ironically, Professor Ayres
also questions the need for Professor Painter to use formal game the-
ory to develop his ideas.' 64 Nevertheless, he thinks Professor Painter
has made "more than a prima facie case" for further application of
game theory to issues in legal ethics.' 65 If Professor Ayres is right,
then Professor Painter's lucid tutorial on game theory and its applica-
tion has done many of us in the field a service.
C. Davis on the Regulatory Role of Liability Insurers
As Professor Wilkins makes clear, liability controls are a major cog
in the machine of lawyer regulation. But the mechanisms by which
liability controls influence lawyers are not well understood. The role
of liability insurance is a particular mystery, especially for anyone in-
terested in the institutions of lawyer regulation. On the one hand, in-
surance bolsters the effects of liability controls by assuring that
relatively few law firms will be judgment-proof and, therefore, beyond
the threat of liability. Premium differentials may also send lawyers
valuable signals about the riskiness of certain behavior. On the other
hand, the very fact that it is insured may embolden a firm to take
undue risks, especially if premiums are not geared to its loss
experience.
162. The Model Rules permit lawyers, with client consent, to impose limitations on
the representation, but not to the point where clients surrender their fundamental
rights to effective representation. Model Rules, supra note 29, Rule 1.2(c) & cmt. 5.
163. See Ian Ayres, Response to Painter, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 201, 206 (1996).
164. Id at 202-05.
165. Id at 208.
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The Symposium article by Anthony Davis, a legal ethics teacher as
well as a lawyer who "audits" law firms for malpractice insurers, ana-
lyzes one aspect of the liability insurer's influence on law practice.)6
It is well understood that malpractice insurers help their insureds
avoid liability by providing expert risk-management advice. 67 Some
commentators have also recognized that with the growing exposure of
law firms to civil liability, some insurers have begun to try to influence
the development of conduct rules for lawyers. 16 But we have almost
no understanding of whether or how much insurers influence law
practice through the limits and conditions they write into their poli-
cies. This is Davis's subject.
Davis argues that insurers use exclusions to discourage their in-
sureds from engaging in some forms of risky conduct, including con-
duct that is permitted by conduct rules but might nonetheless enerate
costly-to-defend lawsuits with at least some nuisance value.' 6 Citing
language from current policies, Davis points in particular to exclusions
for claims arising from conflicts of interest that would be permitted
under prevailing ethics rules.170 These examples demonstrate, hd be-
lieves, that insurers have determined that codes of professional re-
sponsibility are inadequate to prevent lawyers from engaging in
conduct likely to harm clients and thus lead to claims. By excluding
coverage in these instances, insurers are forcing the legal profession to
"confront the fact" that lawyers should not engage in representations
involving even some permissible conflicts or must at least "assume the
entire risk of the consequences.'1 7  Davis goes so far as to predict
that "Insurers will accomplish what decades of drafting and redrafting
ethics codes have failed to achieve, namely the effective elimination of
conflicts of interest from the practice of law."'"
Responding to Davis's Article, Professor Charles Silver doubts
whether policy exclusions are imposed in a conscious effort to influ-
ence lawyer behavior in directions suggested by public policy1 73 He
acknowledges, though, that the crucial question from the standpoint
of understanding the insurer's role in the regulatory universe is
whether policy exclusions affect lawyer conduct, whatever may be the
166. Davis, Insurers as Regulators, supra note 18.
167. See, e.g., Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law
Firms, 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 325, 347, 364 (1989) (discussing the loss prevention program
maintained by the Attorney's Liability Assurance Society ("ALAS"), which is owned
by the nearly 400 large law firms it insures).
168. For evidence of ALAS's influence in the ALI's drafting of the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers, see ALl Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Product Liability
Restatement Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W. 2734, 2734 (May 31, 1994).
169. Davis, Insurers as Regulators, supra note 18, at 213-14.
170. Id. at 212-13.
171. Id. at 214.
172. Id. at 226. Of course, public policy may be disserved by eliminating all con-
flicts, including those that sophisticated clients are willing to consent to.
173. Silver, Response to Davis, supra note 19, at 234-35.
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insurers' motives for using them. 74 On that point, he thinks the evi-
dence is ambiguous. 75 In certain cases, exclusions are highly unlikely
to affect behavior. For example, when a law firm accepts a policy that
excludes coverage for claims arising out of any partner's conduct as
the director of a corporation, it may do so precisely because it expects
none of its partners to serve as directors and does not want to pay for
useless coverage. If, subsequently, no partners do serve as directors,
the policy exclusion will not be the reason. 176
D. Brickman on CEPR's Interpretation of the Model Rules as They
Bear on "Standard" Contingent Fees
The next Article in the Symposium, by Professor Brickman, is a cri-
tique of a recent opinion published by the ABA ethics committee. 177
ABA Formal Opinion 94-389 responds to questions posed to CEPR
by Professor Brickman and others. The Opinion refuses to declare
unethical the practice of charging a routine or standard contingent fee
to all of one's personal injury clients even though the risk of receiving
no recovery may vary considerably from client to client, in some cases
approaching zero.'17 Professor Brickman applies to CEPR's Opinion
the tools of legal analysis which scholars normally reserve for judicial
opinions. And why not? The Opinion purports to be an interpreta-
tion of Model Rule 1.5(a)-"a lawyer's fee shall be reasonable"-
which has become legally binding on lawyers in most states. 179 Profes-
sor Brickman finds the analysis in Opinion 94-389 seriously deficient.
But he does not stop there. True to the legal process theme of the
Symposium, he tries to identify the institutional features of CEPR and
the ABA that may account for the Opinion's weaknesses. What he
finds lurking behind the Opinion is the self-interest not only of the
plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers who benefit from charging standard
contingent fees but of insurance defense counsel as well. Defense
lawyers, far from operating as a countervailing political force to the
plaintiffs' bar, are in league with it.'8 0
174. Il at 235.
175. Id at 234-41.
176. Id at 240-41.
177. See Brickman, Contingency Fees, supra note 30.
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389
(1994).
179. Model Rules, supra note 29, Rule 1.5(a).
180. Brickman, Contingency Fees, supra note 30, at 257-58. He states:
As plaintiff lawyers' effective hourly rates of return increase, defendants
seeking to retain comparable quality levels of counsel must thus raise the
rates they pay to counsel. Accordingly, opinions such as 94-389, which ratify
substantial increases in contingency fee incomes by insulating these fees
from ethical restraints, do in fact favor the financial interests of both plaintiff
and defense lawyers.
Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, Professor Brickman suggests that the ABA may be
less reliable as a rulemaker and rule interpreter on the subject of contingent fees than
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Like Professor Susan Koniak,' 8' I have several reservations about
Professor Brickman's analysis. First, if CEPR's interpretation of
Model Rule 1.5 as it applies to contingent fees was hopelessly "bi-
ased" by considerations of professional self-interest-Professor Brick-
man never pinpoints any mechanism by which plaintiffs' and defense
lawyers influenced the Opinion-then I see no reason to think that
the ABA House of Delegates was any less "biased" when it adopted
Rule 1.5(a) in the first place. Surely the composition of the ABA
membership did not dramatically change from 1983, when the Model
Rules were adopted, to 1994, when CEPR penned its Opinion. Yet,
on this analysis, Professor Brickman's problem would not be that
CEPR misread legislative intent, but that it refused to amend bad leg-
islation sub silentio. Is Professor Brickman not faulting CEPR for re-
fusing to usurp the legislative role of another institution, the House of
Delegates? Is that an appropriate criticism of CEPR when it is sup-
posed to be wearing its interpretive hat?
Second, if Professor Brickman's broader point is that the ABA
should not be entrusted with the tasks of making and interpreting eth-
ics rules as they bear on contingent fees,ia then he is arguably com-
mitting the sin of drawing conclusions about the proper allocation of
regulatory authority on the basis of a single-institutional analysis
rather than the more appropriate comparative analysis."n One won-
ders what alternative institution Professor Brickman would look to as
a source of better rules on contingent fee practices. Even public refer-
enda have not proven to be a fruitful avenue for contingent fee re-
form, in part, no doubt, because of aggressive advertising against the
referenda by trial lawyers' associations.'"
E. Little on Regulating Federal Prosecutors
For a decade, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") has
fought with the private bar and the state supreme courts for regula-
the American Trial Lawyers' Association, a specialty bar for plaintiffs' lawyers. See id.
at 298.
181. See Susan P. Koniak, Principled Opinions: Response to Brickman, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 337 (1996) [hereinafter Koniak, Response to Brickman].
182. Professor Brickman describes ABA Opinion 389 as "so unbalanced that any
claim to respect from courts and state bar association ethics committees is, or at least
should be, foreclosed." Brickman, Contingency Fees, supra note 30, at 249 (footnote
omitted).
183. As Professor Koniak notes, even if Professor Brickman is right about the
ABA's biases, "what larger implications, if any, does his view... have for how law-
yers should be regulated?" Koniak, Response to Brickman, supra note 181, at 338.
184. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Cougars and Lawyers Come Out Ahead in Pro-
positions on California Ballot, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1996, at All (Nat'l ed.). Nor in
this article does Professor Brickman consider whether ex post judicial review of con-
tingent fees are an adequate protection against the dangers of standardized fees.
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tory control over certain aspects of the work of federal prosecutors. 185
Drawing on his considerable experience in the DOJ, Professor Little
considers the DOJ's legal authority to adopt and enforce its own rules
for prosecutors and to preempt state ethics rules and override federal
court rules in the process. 18 6 Concluding that the DOJ has such au-
thority, Professor Little goes on to address a question more central to
the legal process theme of this Symposium-whether or when the
DOJ should, as a matter of policy, exercise this authority. 187
The war has featured two skirmishes over ethics rules. To avoid
unwarranted "intrusions" into relations between defense lawyers and
their clients, the ABA, along with some state supreme courts, adopted
rules requiring prosecutors to gain judicial approval in an adversary
proceeding before subpoenaing a criminal defense lawyer to appear
before a grand jury.188 On similar grounds, the ABA, some local bars,
and some federal courts interpreted the "anti-contact" provisions of
Model Rule 4.2 to ban most prosecutorial contacts with defendants or
targets of criminal investigations without their lawyers' consent. 189
The DOJ responded in 1994 by promulgating its own more lenient
anti-contact regulation and preempting the enforcement of more re-
strictive local rules. 190 The DOJ intends to interpret and enforce the
regulation in its Office of Professional Responsibility.' 91
By Professor Little's account, Attorney General Reno had strong
policy reasons for issuing her anti-contact rule; Rule 4.2 was being in-
terpreted inconsistently, leaving federal prosecutors uncertain of their
exposure to discipline and chilling their use of investigative techniques
such as ex parte interviews with the employees of a represented corpo-
rate target.'9g Because those justifications concern rule content and
interpretation rather than rule enforcement, Professor Little argues
that the Wilkins framework cannot account for the "Reno rule.' 93
Nevertheless, Professor Little believes the DOJ should not go further
and promulgate a comprehensive set of preemptive ethics rules for
federal prosecutors, because its enforcement costs would more than
offset the benefits of nationwide uniformity. 94 Indeed, now that the
Attorney General has demonstrated her will and authority to make
preemptive rules in the face of a "crisis," Professor Little would wel-
185. Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:
The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 291,
292 (1992).
186. Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 378-410.
187. See id. at 411-27.
188. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(f) (1991). The Rule was
amended in 1995 to delete this requirement.
189. Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 361-63, 367-77.
190. See id. at 376.
191. See supra note 117.
192. Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 55, at 369-75.
193. Id at 413-14.
194. Id- at 88, 415, 418-19.
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come negotiations between the DOJ and the chief justices of the state
supreme courts to hammer out a mutually acceptable version of
Model Rule 4.2, with enforcement authority reverting to the states
and federal district courts.195
Responding to Professor Little's analysis, Professor Zacharias ar-
gues that the Attorney General's authority to promulgate a preemp-
tive anti-contact rule for federal prosecutors is far from clear." He
also criticizes Professor Little's "somewhat too narrow," "two-dimen-
sional" approach to the question of who should make ethics rules for
federal prosecutors. 97 Professor Zacharias points out that anti-sub-
poena and anti-contact rules affect the balance of power between de-
fense and prosecution in criminal cases. 98 He fears that both the
ABA and the Justice Department have interests too parochial to
make them trustworthy as rulemakers on such subjects.' The ABA
and state bars have been too dominated by the defense bar to give
adequate weight to the prosecutor's perspective. Moreover, in the
terminology of institutional economist Albert Hirschman, °00 the DOJ,
having failed to gain an adequate "voice" in the private bar, re-
sponded with a predictable "exit" strategy making its own prosecu-
tion-biased anti-contact rule and resisting enforcement of the bar's
anti-subpoena rule.
Professor Zacharias thinks the anti-subpoena and anti-contact is-
sues must be resolved in one of two ways: a dynamic process of ABA
thesis, DOJ antithesis, and jointly negotiated synthesis; or the even-
tual intervention of Congress, which could broker an appropriate
compromise.20' The ABA has been persuaded to drop its anti-sub-
poena rule, but no such "synthesis" has occurred in the anti-contact
debate. If the impasse continues, Professor Zacharias hopes and
195. Id. at 426-27.
196. Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors,
or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 Fordham L Rev. 429,
431-46, 5-33 (1996) [hereinafter Zacharias, Response to Little].
197. Id. at 462.
198. Id. at 449.
199. Id. Nor are the courts satisfactory arbiters of the dispute; they have their own
institutional axes to grind. Id at 425-54. If the ABA is an unreliable maker of conduct
rules for prosecutors because it is institutionally biased toward the defense lawyer's
point of view, one wonders how reliable a rulemaker it can be on many other subjects
on which its rules affect interests, such as consumer interests, that are not directly
represented in the ABA. Professor Zacharias offers no guidelines for judgment on
the point. As Professor Brickman points out, the fact that plaintiffs' personal injury
lawyers and insurance defense lawyers are both well represented in the ABA does not
necessarily imply that ABA rules or ethics opinions on subjects such as the contingent
fee will be appropriately balanced. Brickman, Contingency Fees, supra note 30, at 257-
59. Professor Brickman views ABA rules and ethics opinions on such subjects as
more or less the product of a conspiracy between two branches of the profession.
200. Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty- Responses to Decline in
Fu-ms, Organizations, and States 4, 34 (1970).
201. Zacharias, Response to Little, supra note 196, at 460-61.
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predicts that Congress will intervene.2 02 And he welcomes DOJ's
anti-contact rule, not because DOJ is less biased than the ABA-it is
not-but because DOJ's response is a precondition to getting Con-
gress, the superior rulemaker, to intervene.0 3
CONCLUSION
This Symposium is not designed to provide definitive answers to the
question: Who should regulate lawyers? The very meaning of institu-
tional "competence" to perform regulatory tasks is too controverted
to allow for many definitive answers. Instead, these Articles and Re-
sponses were designed to be speculative, to take risks, to play with
new ideas, and to provoke. We do hope, however, that the Sympo-
sium will serve as an effective promotion for the application of legal
process insights to issues in the regulation of lawyers. The field of
lawyer regulation is now rife with problems of institutional choice.
We need a richer body of scholarship to address the problems at hand.
202. Id at 455, 461.
203. Id.
[Vol. 65
